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In this paper we provide a micro model of loans which the lender is a monopolistic bank 
and the borrower is a competitive consumer with consumption habits who may default 
on part of his debt. In this setting, we prove that the loan demand curve is kinked and 
therefore it is possible to find interest rate rigidity in equilibrium as well as asymmetric 
response of loans to interest rate variations. Finally, we show through an example that 
the credit supply, as a function of the marginal cost of the bank, exhibits a discontinuity 
on that marginal cost. As a consequence, lowering the basic interest rate of the economy 
may produce a sudden increase in credit demand/supply and in the default on debts.
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Resumo
Neste artigo proporcionamos um modelo microeconômico de empréstimos, em que o ce-
dente do empréstimo é um banco monopolista e o tomador do empréstimo é um consumidor 
competitivo com hábitos no consumo que pode não honrar os seus compromissos de crédito 
em parte ou totalmente. Neste cenário, provamos que a curva de demanda por empréstimos 
é quebrada e, portanto, é possível encontrar rigidez da taxa de juros em equilíbrio, assim 
como resposta assimétrica da demanda por empréstimos a variações da taxa de juros. Fi-
nalmente, mostramos através de um exemplo que a oferta de crédito, como função do custo 
marginal do banco, exibe uma descontinuidade nesse custo marginal. Como consequência, 
diminuições na taxa básica da economia podem produzir um súbito aumento na demanda/
oferta de crédito e na inadimplência. 
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i. introduction
One of the main concerns in applied and theoretical economics is the absence or slow 
response of some economic variables to shocks in fundamentals or in economic policy 
instruments. New Keynesian models suppose that agents have delays in some decisions 
and that they generate rigidity or sticky prices. In that vein, some works evaluate the 
impact of monetary policies on inflation and growth, supposing that some firms do not 
update prices after shocks in costs or other relevant variables (Calvo 1983, Rotemberg; 
Woodford 1997 and 1998). 
An alternative to sticky prices, provided by Mankiw and Reis (2001) and Keen (2007), 
is the assumption of sticky information, which is caused by costs in collecting new 
information or in re-executing optimization processes. Industrial Organization theory 
provides another explanation for price rigidity: the stickiness in prices results from 
collusive behavior among firms. Empirical and econometric analyses were performed 
to conclude that market concentration is responsible for that phenomenon (Mills 1927, 
Means 1935, Carlton 1986 and 1989). On the theoretical side, the most popular theory to 
explain rigidity is the “kinked demand” (Sweezy 1939 and Hall; Hitch 1939); however, 
Scherer (1980) and Tirole (1988) highlight some important shortcomings of that theory. 
Implicit or explicit collusions are also included as a theoretical explanation for rigidity 
(Athey; Bagwell; Sanchirico 2004).
In credit markets, empirical studies report not only rigidity in the interest rates but also 
asymmetric response of them with respect to costs variations or shocks in interest rates 
of funds. Hannan and Berger (1991) analyzed monthly data of 398 American banks in 
the period September 1983 to December 1986 and argued that the deposit rate rigidity 
is a result of either the market concentration or the size of the consumer base. Using 
a multinomial logit model they analyzed the asymmetric response of interest rate in 
relation to increases or decreases in the security-rate. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) show 
that banking concentration is responsible for the asymmetric adjustment of the deposit 
rates. To this end, they use monthly data of a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve 
Board on the yield behavior of two types of deposits: the six-month certificate of deposit 
and money market deposit account. They consider a sample of 255 banks located in 105 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the USA over the period October 1983 to November 
1987 to accomplish a panel data analysis that allows concluding that asymmetric ad-
justment. Scholnick (1996) examined the difference between the upward and downward 
rigidity of the retail interest rate using co-integration and error correction methodology. 
The analysis was made for the banking systems of Malaysia and Singapore after their 
financial liberalizations occurred in 1978.
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In Brazil it is quite interesting the presence of the rigidity of the market interest rate. In 
Figure 1 we show the values of the SElIC interest rate (which is the reference interest 
rate for the Government debt) versus the interest rate paid by consumers from 1994 
to 2009 (given in monthly percentages). That is the interest rate of credit with non-
earmarked resources offered to individuals (Central Bank of Brazil, BCB – DEPEC).
Using that data we adjust two linear regressions between those variables, one for SELIC 
values lower than 3.3% and another for values greater than 3.3%. We can observe that 
for a SELIC greater than 3.3% the consumer interest rate remains almost unaltered, thus 
changes in the interest rate paid by the Government when it is greater than 3.3% per 
month does not affect the market interest rate paid by the consumers.
Figure 1 - SELIC vs. Consumer Interest Rate 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil - DEPEC.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework where interest rate rigi-
dity arises due to the existence of consumption habits of the borrowers. More precisely, 
shocks in the marginal costs of the bank affect neither the market interest rate nor the 
amount of loans taking by the borrowers. To obtain this, we consider a partial equili-
brium model, where the borrowers may default in part on their debts and they do this 
indeed, in order to preserve the consumption in a previous period (consumption habit 
formation). As a consequence, they accept to pay higher interest rates even though the 
marginal cost of the bank might be reduced. Furthermore the response of the loan de-
mand is asymmetric to increases or decreases of the market interest rate. Therefore, not 
only may the banking industry concentration provoke the rigidity, but also the demand 
side may, when individuals want to preserve the status quo in their consumptions. In 
addition, using the same loan market model, we verify, through a simple example, the 
existence of a discontinuity in the demand/supply of credit as a function of the marginal 
cost of the bank. In particular, it implies that successive decreases of the basic interest 
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rate of the economy (which is part of the marginal cost) may provoke a sudden increase 
in the amount of credit and in the default on debts. This is a counter-productive effect if 
the monetary authority aims to reduce the basic interest rate without producing inflation 
or an increase in the default rate on debts. 
Consumption habits and their consequences have been extensively studied in econo-
mics. Using information included in the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, Dynan 
(2000) tests the presence of consumption habits in the USA economy and asserts that 
the same may explain the excess of smoothness in the aggregate consumption. That data 
consider information about annual income, employment and demographic characteris-
tics of 3.153 households from 1974 to 1987. In another work, using USA quarterly data 
of consumption, price levels, federal fund rates, disposable personal income and GDP 
(excluding non-durable goods and services) from 1966:I to 1995:IV, Fuhrer (2000) also 
tests and rejects the hypothesis of no habit formation in consumption in a monetary-
policy model. In order to explain the strong correlation between saving and growth, 
Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000) provide a dynamic model where individuals exhibit 
consumption habits. They show that classical models with standard consumer utility 
functions are unable to explain such a correlation because forward-looking households 
save less in a fast-growing economy since they will be richer in the future than they 
are today.  
The paper is divided in the following way: in section II we present our theoretical fra-
mework; section III is devoted to presenting the results: the asymmetric response of the 
loan demand and the rigidity of the interest rate. At the end of that section we provide an 
example showing the discontinuity of the demand/supply of credit in the marginal cost of 
the bank; section IV presents the conclusions and the proofs are shown in the Appendix.
ii. the model
We will consider a loan market model with a large number of borrowers represented by 
a single agent and a lender represented by a monopolistic bank. The idea is to model 
borrowers are interest-rate-takers in the loan market and lenders that have market power 
to decide the interest rate, so this framework is the simplest one to attain this goal. In 
addition, if there exists a small number of banks, some collusive behavior among them 
may lead the bank system to act as a monopolistic bank. There are two periods t = 0, 1 
and in t = 0 the borrower demands loans (m) and consumption ( 0c ). In t = 1, the same 
agent delivers (part of) the debt and also consumes ( 1c ). In case the borrower does not 
fulfill his entire obligation, he will suffer a penalty in his utility function. The interest 
rate on loans is given by 0>r .
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All these elements are included in the classic models with possibility of default (Dubey; 
Geanakoplos; Shubik 2005). In this work we consider an additional term representing 
the consumption habits of the borrower. If in the second period, the consumption is gre-
ater or equal to that of the first period, the agent does not suffer any loss in his utility. 
Otherwise, he will have a disutility proportional to the consumption decrease. Namely, 
the payoff of the borrower with consumption plan 210 ),( +∈ Rcc , loan demand 0≥m  and 
delivery decision ])1(,0[ mrD +∈  is given by:
          (1)
The parameters  and  in (1) represent the intensity of the penalty for defaulting 
and the disutility for the decrease in the first period consumption due to the consump-
tion habits, respectively. Notice that the last term in (1) is an extra term included to 
show the willingness to maintain the status quo in consumption relative to the first pe-
riod consumption. If the consumer increases his consumption in the second period, the 
only benefit is already computed in the utility function U. However, if the consumption 
is reduced, not only does the utility function U include the loss of that reduction, but 
there is another negative effect represented in the last term of equation (1). In infinite 
horizon models, the influence of the habit formation in consumption is measured as a 
penalty in deviations from the average consumption in a predetermined past period 
(see Campbell; L0; Mackinlay). In a two-period setting we find our representation as a 
quite reasonable simplification. We will suppose separability and Inada conditions in 
preferences, as stated in the following assumption:
Hypothesis (H): The utility function of consumption is a separable function 
; where RRu →+:  is twice differentiable, 0'' ,0' <> uu  and sa-
tisfies . 
Finally, if 00 >p  and 01 >p  are the commodity prices of goods and 00 >w  and 01 >w  are 
the initial endowments in periods t = 0, 1 respectively, then the budget constrain for the 
representative agent is defined by the following inequalities:
mwpcp +≤ 0000                                (2)
1111 wpDcp ≤+                                          (3)
mrD )1(0 +≤≤                             (4)
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In this way, the borrower problem is defined as the maximization of the payoff 
function (1) in variables mcc ,, 10  and D  subject to the restrictions (2), (3) and (4). 
The demand for loans is the )(* rmm =  component of the solution of that problem. 
In this economy, the lender side is modeled by a monopolistic bank which decides 
the value of the interest rate 0>r  to be fixed for private loans, given the loan demand 
curve )(rmm = . The assumption of a monopoly in the loan market may be seen as a 
simplification of a collusive behavior of an oligopoly in that sector. Thus, if )(mc  is the 
cost of the monopolist, its problem is to choose the interest rate for loans in order to 
maximize )(()()1()()( rmcrmrmcmR −+=− ).
iii. asymmetry of the Loan demand and rigidity of the interest rate
In this section we will prove the asymmetry of the loan demand response to changes 
in the interest rate (a kinked demand curve for loans). As a consequence, the marginal 
revenue of the monopolist will present a discontinuity provoking rigidity in the inte-
rest rate with respect to marginal costs changes of the monopolist. In the literature the 
discontinuity of the marginal revenue (and therefore the rigidity of prices) is found as 
a consequence of some kind of oligopolistic competition among firms (Sweezy 1939 
and Hall; Hitch 1939). In our case, the kinked demand results from the endeavor of 
borrowers to maintain the status quo in their consumptions. 
The following proposition states the existence of (at most) two kinks in the demand 
for loans. 
proposition 1. (Asymmetry of the response to interest rate changes)  Under hypothesis 
(H) the loan demand curve )(rmm =  is strictly decreasing and there exist two values 
of the interest rate: 
  and  
 
where the demand for loans is kinked. In other words: 
)('lim)('lim rmrm
ii rrrr
−+ →→
≠ ; 2,1=i
The proposition above implies the shape shown in Figure 2 for the loan demand. Note that 
21 rr < , and if we have in addition that ,  (  is the intertemporal 
discount rate and  is the inflation rate) then 02 >r . Therefore if 01 >r  then we will 
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have two kinks in the demand curve for loans; otherwise there will be just one. In each 
kink it is easy to verify the asymmetric response of demands for loans with respect to 
interest rate changes. 
It is also worth noting that the difference  depends on the intensity of 
the consumption habits. Furthermore, from the proof of Proposition 1, we can conclude 
that  implies the non-existence of any kink in the loan demand curve, therefore, for 
this type of models, habit formation is a necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining 
kinked demand.
Figure 2 -  Demand for Loans under Consumption habits and the asymmetric  Response to Interest 
Rate Changes
          
m
r
m1m2
r2
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If we suppose that the marginal cost of the monopolistic bank is a constant ( ) then 
we will have the following result.
proposition 2. (Rigidity of the interest rate) Under hypothesis (H) and the assumption of 
constant marginal costs of the monopolist bank ( ), there exist two open intervals 
1I  and 2I  such that: a) for all 2Ic ∈ , the equilibrium interest rate is 2r , b) for all 1Ic ∈ , 1r  
is a relative minimum of the profit and the equilibrium interest rate is located around 
that minimum. 
Proposition 2 asserts that any change in the marginal cost that leaves it in the interval 
2I  will not have effect on the equilibrium interest rate which will remain in 2r  (and as 
a consequence, the loan demand will remain equal to 2m ), this is the rigidity of the in-
terest rate. Figure 3 shows the shape of the marginal revenue and one possible position 
of the marginal cost where we obtain the rigidity.
If in addition, the monopolistic bank finances the Government debt too; we can obtain 
an important conclusion from the rigidity of the market interest rate with respect to 
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changes in the interest rate paid by the Government. let 0>fr  be the interest rate on 
the Government loans (risk-free interest rate). If M is the total amount of resources 
available to the bank to lend either to the borrowers or to the Government, the problem 
of the lender results:
 = ,
Figure 3: The marginal Revenue of the monopolistic bank
MR
cI2
MC
m
m1m2
I1
therefore any change in fr  that leaves frc ++1  in the interval 2I  affects neither 
the equilibrium interest rate nor the amount of loans,  which remain in 2r  and 2m  
respectively.
a numerical example
In order to illustrate the main result of the paper, we provide the following example. 
It will also allow us to show how sequential marginal cost reductions may provoke a 
sudden increase in the loans amount. let us consider , where 0>b  and 
suppose 00 =w , 2.31 =w ,41 10 =p  and . The demand for loans is given by:
41 This value allows us to consider market interest rates in the interval 0.4] ,0[  and as a consequence, the solution 
of the borrower problem is interior with respect to the restriction mrD )1(0 +≤≤ .
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where 1r  and 2r  are defined in Proposition 1. Let us consider the following para-
meter values: ; ; ; ; . With these values we obtain 
)125.3 ,0875.0(),( 11 =mr  and )875.1 ,3125.0(),( 22 =mr . The intervals given in Figure 3 
are 0.775] ,525.0[1 =I  and 1.125] ,975.0[2 =I . Then, for any value of the marginal cost 
contained in 2I , the market interest rate remains invariant and equal to 3125.02 =r . This 
is the rigidity of the interest rate. In addition, we would like to comment on another 
remarkable effect of the model. If the marginal cost belongs to the interval 1I , the profit 
of the monopolist will exhibit two relative maximums. Figure 4 depicts the profits for 
three values of the marginal cost.
Figure 4: The monopolist profit for three marginal Costs
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As we can observe, reductions in the marginal cost provoke a jump (discontinuity) in the 
total amount of credit supply. Figure 5 shows the discontinuity of the equilibrium loan 
amount ( )(cm ) with respect to the marginal cost of the monopolist (c).
Figure 5 - Discontinuity of the Equilibrium Loan amount with Respect to the marginal Cost of the 
monopolist
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The explanation for this effect is the following. Reductions in the marginal cost pro-
voke reductions in the market interest rate, so individuals pass from region 10 cc =  to 
region 10 cc > . This is done by augmenting both consumptions, taking more credit in 
the first period and delivering a lower part of the debt. This is an important effect that 
monetary authorities must take into account in the process of reducing the basic interest 
rate of the economy. There is a threshold value for this interest rate from which agents 
significantly increase the credit demand, the current and the future consumption and 
the default. If the objective is to reduce the interest rate without provoking inflation (due 
to the increase in consumption) or increasing the default on debts, the authority has to 
consider this perverse effect. 
iV. Conclusions
In this paper we provided an explanation of the asymmetry of the loan demand response 
to changes in the interest rate. The kinked demand for loans that provokes that effect 
is a result of the borrowers’ willingness to maintain the status quo in their former con-
sumptions. As a consequence, the marginal revenue of the monopolistic bank presents 
a discontinuity, generating rigidity of both the interest rate and loans with respect to 
changes in its marginal cost. This kind of consumption habit was not used to explain 
phenomena of asymmetry and rigidity in the literature, so it provides another expla-
nation that may complement the theories of sticky prices based on concentration or 
collusion of firms in specific markets. 
Using the same model, we show that the amount of loans may have a sudden increase 
when the marginal cost of the monopolist is reduced. The low penalty for defaulting 
on a small debt (due to the small market interest rate) allows increasing consumption 
in both periods (taking out more loans in the first period and delivering a lower part of 
the debt in the second period).
From the monetary policy point of view, both effects described in the paper (the rigidity 
of the interest rate and the discontinuity in the amount of credit) are market imperfec-
tions that policy-makers must take into consideration. This is because, as we noted 
in the comments of section III, it is possible that the monetary policy instrument (the 
interest rate paid by the Government on its loans), might not be effective (if it falls into 
the region of interest rate rigidity) or even provoke a sudden increase in inflation and 
increase in the default on debts.
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appendiX
proof of proposition 1. The borrower problem is to maximize (1) restricted to the 
budget set:
.
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We are imposing bounded short-sales in order to guarantee finite solutions. Let 
)(* rmm =  be the loan demand, which is (upper hemi-) continuous in r > 0. The beha-
vior of that solution will be described from a comparative static analysis, so interior 
solutions 0* >m  and ** )1(0 mrD +<<  will be supposed. Since the payoff function 
depends on the signal of )/()/( 1010 pDpmwcc ++∆−=−  (where 01 www −=∆ ), we 
will separate the analysis into three cases:
Case I)   w
p
D
p
m ∆>+
10
In this case, the first order conditions are given by:
                                                                         (A1)
                                                                         (A2)
From (A1) and (A2) we can find:
and . 
Whenever necessary, we will denote the demand for loans in this case by . 
In order to compatibilize with w
p
rD
p
rm ∆>+
10
)()( , we must have:
Case II) 
 
w
p
D
p
m ∆<+
10
The first order conditions are:
                                                                         (A3)
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                                                            (A4)
From equations (A3) and (A4), the loan demand and delivery decisions are 
 and   respectively. In this case, the loan 
demand is denoted by ( )IIm r .
As in case I, the restriction w
p
rD
p
rm ∆<+
10
)()(  implies the following demand for the 
interest rate:
Case III)  w
p
D
p
m ∆=+
10
Since a solution exists for all 0>r , this case will correspond to the domain ),( 21 rrr ∈ . 
The first order condition is:
 
                                                                     
(A5)
From (A5) we obtain  and the restriction 
of this case implies . As done formerly, we denote the demand 
for loans here by )(rmIII . From (A1), (A3) and (A5) one can verify that the function 
)(rmm =  is a strictly decreasing function. Furthermore, the following limit exists,
lim ( ) ( );    1, 2
i
i i      r r
m r m m r i
→
= = =
To prove the non-differentiability of )(rm  in ir , we use equations (A1), (A3) and (A5) 
to calculate the derivatives in each interval, namely:
if 1rr < , then (A1) implies: ;
if 2rr > , then (A2) implies: ;
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if ),( 21 rrr ∈ , then (A3) implies: ,
where 000 /)( prmwc += . Therefore, we can conclude that,
)('lim)('lim
11
rmrm
rrrr +− →→
<   and  )('lim)('lim
22
rmrm
rrrr +− →→
>      
proof of proposition 2. The monopolistic bank revenue is ( ) (1 ( ))R m r m m= + , where 
)(mrr =  is the (inverse) demand for loans. 0* >m  is a solution for the monopolistic bank 
if and only if  for all *mm <  and  for all *mm > , 
where  and  are the marginal revenue and the marginal cost of the monopolist 
respectively. 
The marginal revenue has two discontinuities. In 2m  we have
 
So, if c  belongs to the interval , then the equilibrium interest rate 
is 2
* mm = . In 1m  the behavior is qualitatively different. If we calculate the marginal 
revenue in that point we will have
Therefore , thus, if , then 1
* mm =  becomes 
a relative minimum with two relative maximums around it.                       
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